%0 Unpublished work %T Radical Activism and Self-regulation: An Optimal Campaign Mechanism %+ Paris School of Economics (PSE) %+ Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE) %+ Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1) %A Chiroleu-Assouline, Mireille %A Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane %Z PSE Working Papers n°2022-07 %P 38 p. %8 2022-02 %D 2022 %K Activist campaign %K Mechanism design %K Self-regulation %K Repression Activist campaign %K Repression %Z Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinancePreprints, Working Papers, ... %X We study the problem faced by activists who want to maximize …rms'compliance with high environmental standards. Our focus is on radical activism which relies on non-violent civil disobedience. The threat of disruptive actions is used to force …rms to concede i.e., to engage in self-regulation. We adopt a mechanism design approach to characterize an optimal campaign. The analysis informs that the least vulnerable and most polluting …rms should be targeted with disruptive actions while the others are granted a guarantee not to be targeted in exchange for a concession. This characterization allows studying the determinants of the activist's strength and how it is a¤ected by repression, a central feature in civil disobedience. We …nd that an optimal campaign is relatively resilient to repression and that it creates incentives to free ride in prosecution for individual …rms. Next, we consider heterogeneity in …rms'abatement cost to …nd that an optimal campaign optimizes the allocation of abatment e¤orts and creates incentives for innovation. We discuss some other welfare properties of optimal campaign. %G English %2 https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03586793v2/document %2 https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03586793v2/file/wp_202207_.pdf %L halshs-03586793 %U https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03586793 %~ SHS %~ UNIV-PARIS1 %~ ENS-PARIS %~ ENPC %~ PJSE %~ PSE %~ CNRS %~ EHESS %~ AO-ECONOMIE %~ PARISTECH %~ PJSE_WP %~ PREPRINT %~ PSL %~ PSE_WP %~ INRAE %~ ENS-PSL